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ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), caused
by the SARS coronavirus (CoV), is an emergent
disease that was first reported in the Guangdong
Province of China in November 2002.1–3 It spread
rapidly to Vietnam, Canada, and Hong Kong.4–6
Within months of its emergence in China, it had
affected more than 8000 people and caused 774
deaths in 26 countries on five continents.7,8
International air-travel routes and the presence
of densely populated urban areas, especially in
Asia, facilitated the rapid worldwide spread of the
SARS-CoV.9,10
In mid-March 2003, several SARS cases were
reported in Taiwan, presumably because of its ex-
tensive business ties with Hong Kong and China.11
In April 2003, a severe nosocomial outbreak of
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Background/Purpose: An epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) occurred in Taiwan from
April to July 2003. A nosocomial outbreak of SARS occurred at Kaohsiung Chang Gung Memorial Hospital
(CGMH) in May 2003. The purpose of our study was to survey the prevalence of the SARS coronavirus (CoV)
in a community adjacent to Kaohsiung CGMH and collect demographic data, including basic information
about health status, household, and possible risk factors for SARS-CoV infection.
Methods: We randomly recruited 1030 persons living in three precincts adjacent to Kaohsiung CGMH. For all
subjects, we collected demographic data and measured the seroprevalence of the SARS-CoV with an enzyme-
linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) and an immunofluorescence assay (IFA).
Results: The ELISA was seropositive for 124 of 1030 participants (12%). The more sensitive and specific IFA
confirmed SARS in only two cases (0.19%). Both confirmed cases were under 19 years of age and had no
known SARS-related risk factors.
Conclusion: There was low post-epidemic seroprevalence of SARS-CoV in a community adjacent to a hospital
which had a nosocomial SARS outbreak. The SARS outbreak in Taiwan was primarily limited to hospital
settings. [J Formos Med Assoc 2008;107(11):885–891]
Key Words: community survey, nosocomial infections, SARS-CoV, seroprevalence
©2008 Elsevier & Formosan Medical Association
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1Department of Pediatrics, Chang Gung Memorial Hospital, Keelung, 2Graduate Institute of Clinical Medical Sciences,
4College of Medicine, and 6Laboratory for Epidemiology and Department of Health Care Management, Chang Gung
University, 3Division of Pediatric Infectious Diseases, Chang Gung Children’s Hospital, 5Department of Clinical
Pathology, Chang Gung Memorial Hospital, Taoyuan, 7Department of Internal Medicine, Chang Gung Memorial
Hospital, and 8Department of Pediatrics, Chang Gung Children’s Hospital, Kaohsiung, Taiwan.
Received: January 4, 2008
Revised: April 25, 2008
Accepted: May 27, 2008
*Correspondence to: Dr Tzou-Yien Lin, Department of Pediatrics, Chang Gung Children’s
Hospital, 5 Fu-Hsin Street, Kwei-Shan, Taoyuan 333, Taiwan.
E-mail: pidlin@adm.cgmh.org.tw
M.H. Tsai, et al
886 J Formos Med Assoc | 2008 • Vol 107 • No 11
SARS occurred at Taipei Municipal Ho-Ping Hos-
pital (in northern Taiwan), where an unrecognized
index patient exposed multiple patients, visitors,
and health care workers.12 This outbreak resulted
in more than 10 fatalities and led health authori-
ties near this hospital to implement control pro-
cedures.12 Nonetheless, in early May 2003, the
SARS infection had spread to multiple cities and
regions of Taiwan, and there was a large outbreak
at Kaohsiung Chang Gung Memorial Hospital
(CGMH) in southern Taiwan. Kaohsiung CGMH
temporarily discontinued all emergency and hos-
pital services. By the end of the SARS epidemic in
Taiwan (July 2003), there were 347 confirmed
cases and 37 confirmed deaths.13
Because of its high infectivity and hazard to
global health, scientists have attempted to develop
reliable tests, find effective treatment protocols and
determine the key epidemiologic parameters that
affect the spread of SARS-CoV.2 Previously, we
found that some SARS patients in Taiwan had no
apparent contact histories or travel histories to
epidemic areas, suggesting that there might have
been a sporadic community spread, especially in
Taipei City and in Kaohsiung City.
In the present study, we used two serologic
methods to survey the prevalence of the SARS-
CoV in a community adjacent to Kaohsiung
CGMH where there was a nosocomial outbreak.
We also collected demographic data, including
basic information about health status, household,
and possible risk factors for SARS-CoV infection.
Methods
Study area, study design, collection of
serologic data
We conducted a survey of SARS-CoV seropreva-
lence from August 2003 (1 month after the epi-
demic had ended) to December 2003 in the
San-Ming District (population: 361,330) of
Kaohsiung City (population: 1,509,699). Chang
Gung Memorial Hospital (CGMH; 2464 beds),
which experienced a nosocomial outbreak of SARS
in May 2003, is adjacent to the San-Ming District
(Figure). We selected three precincts of this dis-
trict, all of which are within three city blocks (ap-
proximately 500 m) of the hospital, for serologic
tests and questionnaire surveys. We conducted
age- and gender-stratified sampling using house-
hold registration records. All study subjects pro-
vided written informed consent for participation.
The Institutional Review Board of CGMH approved
this study.
Each participant completed a self-administered
questionnaire that collected basic demographic
data including: residential area; occupation
(health care worker or not); history of chronic
diseases during the epidemic; quarantine during
A
569 m
455 m
485 m
B
C
H
Figure. San-Ming District of Kaohsiung City (1:12,000). H=Chang Gung Memorial Hospital; A, B, C=precincts from which
residents were sampled.
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the epidemic; intrafamilial or outside contact with
SARS cases during the epidemic; travel history in
the previous 6 months; classmates or neighbors
with SARS during the epidemic; public conveyance
used in the previous 6 months; illnesses during
the previous 3 months; and preventive measures
used (such as a mask). People who used masks
were asked to specify the mask type (paper, surgi-
cal, or N95). We defined contacts of SARS cases as
persons who shared meals, a residence, a hospital
room, or a transportation vehicle with a suspected
SARS patient or as persons who visited a suspected
SARS patient within 14 days before the patient’s
onset of symptoms. We also considered persons
who had potential contact with the secretions of
a SARS patient during the patient’s treatment or
care as having had close contact.
Laboratory methods for the detection of
SARS-CoV antibody
After interviewing each subject, we collected a 5mL
blood sample for SARS antibody detection, refrig-
erated it at 4°C, and screened it for the SARS-CoV
antibody using whole viral lysate enzyme-linked
immunosorbent assay (ELISA; Beijing Huada GBI
Biotechnology Co. Ltd., Beijing, China).14,15 If
the ELISA test was positive, we used the indirect
immunofluorescence assay (IFA; Euroimmun Co,
Lübeck, Germany) to retest for the presence of
the SARS-CoV antibody.16–18 We performed an IgG
test for the SARS-CoV by an indirect ELISA test
that used the lysate of whole SARS-CoV as the
coated antigen.17 The cutoff value for a positive
IgG test by ELISA was 0.13 absorbance units
above the negative control.
We performed IFA testing using a diluted
serum specimen that reacted against SARS-CoV-
infected Vero E6 cells and non-infected cells.17,18
First, we placed 25 μL of serial diluted serum
(starting from 1:10) onto each well of the slide
and incubated them for 30 minutes at room
temperature. After washing for 5 minutes twice
with phosphate-buffered saline (PBS), we added
20 μL of diluted fluorescein-labeled anti-human
globulin to each well, and incubated them for 30
minutes at room temperature. Then we washed
the slides twice with PBS and observed samples
under a fluorescence microscope. The cutoff value
for a positive IgG test was 1:10.
Statistical analysis
Confidence intervals were calculated using bino-
mial proportion, a function built in SAS PROC
FREQ in SAS version 9.0 (SAS Institute Inc., Cary,
NC, USA).
Results
We randomly selected 2854 residents using an age-
and gender-stratified sampling method from the
household registration record and attempted to
contact each person by telephone. We excluded
subjects who were not living in Kaohsiung City
during the epidemic. The most frequent reasons
given for refusal to participate were “tired of being
interviewed” and reluctance to disclose personal
information for fear of discrimination. We success-
fully interviewed and obtained blood samples
from 1030 residents (36.1%). None of the subjects
had a clinical diagnosis of SARS or had been quar-
antined during the epidemic. A total of 258 (25%)
subjects had underlying diseases, most of which
(249/258; 96.5%) were mild to moderate. We
defined “mild to moderate underlying diseases”
(e.g. allergic diseases, atopic dermatitis, hepatitis B)
as diseases that were not life-threatening, or that
did not result in immunodeficiency.
We analyzed factors associated with SARS-CoV
infection and stratified the results by age (Table 1).
Forty subjects reported contact with quarantined
person(s). In most cases (33/40; 82.5%), they were
students whose classmates had family members
working in Kaohsiung CGMH during the epi-
demic. The two patients with SARS-CoV seropos-
itivity (as confirmed by IFA) reported no contact
with quarantined persons during the epidemic.
None of the quarantined persons who had con-
tact with our subjects were diagnosed as SARS-
probable cases during the epidemic. Analysis of
other selected factors associated with SARS revealed
that only 17.5% (180/1030) of people used public
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Table 1. Age-specific characteristics, potential risks and protective factors among residents of three precincts
adjacent to a nosocomial SARS outbreak (n = 1030)
Factors potentially associated with SARS-CoV infection n (%) 95% CI
Hospital related (visits to a hospital during epidemic*) 139 (13.5) 11.47–15.73
< 10 yr 10 (7.19) 3.50–12.83
10–19 yr 25 (17.99) 11.99–25.39
20–39 yr 23 (16.55) 10.79–23.79
40–49 yr 34 (24.46) 17.57–32.47
≥ 50 yr 47 (33.81) 26.01–42.32
Community related
Contact with a quarantined person during epidemic 40 (3.9) 2.79–5.25
< 10 yr 0 (0) 0–0
10–19 yr 36 (90.00) 76.34–97.21
20–39 yr 2 (5.00) 0.61–16.92
40–49 yr 1 (2.50) 0.06–13.16
≥ 50 yr 1 (2.50) 0.06–13.16
History of traveling to SARS-affected countries† in previous 6 mo 8 (0.77) 0.33–1.52
Types of transportation used during the epidemic
None mentioned 2 (0.19) 0.02–0.70
None 117 (11.36) 9.42–13.30
Type of transportation 911 (88.45) 86.49–90.40
Private only (cars or motorcycles) 731 (80.24) 77.66–82.83
< 10 yr 166 (22.71) 19.67–25.75
10–19 yr 132 (18.06) 15.27–20.85
20–39 yr 129 (17.65) 14.88–20.41
40–49 yr 133 (18.19) 15.40–20.99
≥ 50 yr 171 (23.39) 20.32–26.46
Public only (taxis, trains or buses) 159 (17.45) 14.99–19.92
< 10 yr 0 (0) 0–0
10–19 yr 135 (84.91) 78.38–90.08
20–39 yr 6 (3.77) 1.40–8.03
40–49 yr 3 (1.89) 0.39–5.41
≥ 50 yr 15 (9.43) 5.38–15.08
Private and public conveyances used 21 (2.31) 1.43–3.50
< 10 yr 0 (0) 0–0
10–19 yr 0 (0) 0–0
20–39 yr 7 (33.33) 14.59–56.97
40–49 yr 3 (14.29) 3.05–36.34
≥ 50 yr 11 (52.38) 29.78–74.29
Masks used when working or going out during the epidemic 607 (58.9) 55.86–61.96
< 10 yr 104 (17.13) 14.22–20.37
10–19 yr 180 (29.65) 26.04–33.46
20–39 yr 102 (16.80) 13.91–20.02
40–49 yr 94 (15.49) 12.70–18.61
≥ 50 yr 127 (20.92) 17.75–24.38
*Hospitals that had an outbreak during the epidemic included Kaohsiung Medical University Hospital, Kaohsiung Chang Gung
Memorial Hospital, Taipei Municipal Ho-Ping Hospital and National Taiwan University Hospital; †China, Hong Kong, Canada, Vietnam
and Singapore.
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conveyance (i.e. taxies, trains or buses), most of
whom (135/180; 75.0%) were under 19 years of
age. Of the 139 persons who had visited hospitals
where outbreaks occurred during the epidemic,
58.3% (81/139) were older than 40 years. Most
(607/1030; 58.9%) subjects reported using masks
as a preventive measure during the epidemic. The
most common types of masks were paper (263/
607; 43.3%) or surgical masks (256/607; 42.2%).
Only a small number (8/1030; 0.8%) of subjects
had traveled to SARS-affected countries (China,
Hong Kong, Canada, Vietnam, or Singapore) in
the 6 months before this investigation.
The age-specific SARS-CoV seropositivity rates
after the epidemic are shown in Table 2. Of the
124 persons with a seropositive ELISA, nearly
98% (121/124) were younger than 19 years of age.
We used the IFA method to confirm the presence
of SARS-CoV in all subjects who had a positive
ELISA result. IFA confirmed SARS-CoV in two of
the 124 cases, both of whom were under 19 years
of age. We found no SARS-related risk profiles or
signs of respiratory tract infection in these two
patients during the 3 months after the epidemic.
Discussion
Main findings of this study
This study provides important information about
the potential for the spread of SARS from a hospital
to a local community. The Taiwanese community
we studied was next to a hospital that had a noso-
comial outbreak. Only 0.19% (2/1030) of study
subjects in the community had positive ELISA
and IFA results for SARS-CoV. The two infected
patients were asymptomatic, had no history of con-
tact with quarantined individuals, no history of
travel to epidemic areas and did not visit the hos-
pital where there was a nosocomial outbreak. Our
results indicate very limited spread of the SARS-
CoV into an adjacent community following a
nosocomial outbreak.
What is already known on this topic
A previous post-epidemic serologic survey in
Hong Kong showed a low SARS-CoV seropositivity
rate (0.19%; 2/1068) in 1068 asymptomatic close
contacts of SARS patients.15 Those results are
consistent with our findings. Another SARS sero-
prevalence study of 574 general practitioners in
Hong Kong found 0% infection rate of SARS-
CoV in the at-risk group.19
Even in hospital settings, however, the sero-
prevalence of SARS in health care workers is still
not high. For example, a seroprevalence study of
193 emergency department workers exposed to
SARS in a Taiwanese medical center found that the
incidence of SARS-CoV infection was only 4.7%
(9/193).18 Taken together, these previous studies
indicated that although transmission of SARS-CoV
occurs primarily in hospital settings, transmission
in hospital settings and in the community are gen-
erally not serious. Although asymptomatic and
Table 2. Age-specific seropositivity rates after the SARS epidemic among residents of three precincts adjacent to a nosocomial
SARS outbreak
Age (yr)
Cases tested ELISA-seropositive cases IFA-seropositive cases
n (%) 95% CI n (%) 95% CI n (%) 95% CI
Total 1030 – 124 (12.04) 10.11–14.18 2 (0.19) 0.02–0.70
< 10 202 (19.61) 17.23–22.17 67 (33.17) 26.72–40.12 1 (0.49) 0.01–2.73
10–19 334 (32.43) 29.57–35.38 54 (16.17) 12.39–20.56 1 (0.30) 0.01–1.66
20–29 61 (5.92) 4.56–7.54 2 (3.28) 0.40–11.35 0 0
30–39 78 (7.57) 6.03–9.36 1 (1.28) 0.03–6.94 0 0
40–49 142 (13.79) 11.74–16.04 0 0 0 0
≥ 50 213 (20.68) 18.24–23.28 0 0 0 0
ELISA = enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay; IFA = indirect fluorescence assay.
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mild SARS infections have been documented in
other countries, these seem to be uncommon and
do not appear to extend the chain of infection.20
What this study adds
Our analysis of the risk factors for SARS-CoV
transmission indicated that 13.5% of subjects had
visited a hospital where a SARS outbreak occurred,
0.8% had traveled to affected countries, and 3.9%
had contact with a quarantined individual during
the epidemic. Most subjects (58.9%) reported hav-
ing used masks as preventive measures and having
infrequently (17.5%) used public conveyances.
A previous study showed that use of masks sig-
nificantly lowered the risk of SARS-CoV transmis-
sion.21 The low prevalence of SARS-CoV in our
study population may be because SARS-CoV is
transmitted via direct or indirect contact of the
mucous membrane with infectious respiratory
droplets.22 However, our results do not exclude the
possibility of a small subclinical asymptomatic
infection of SARS-CoV in this community, as has
been previously observed in Hong Kong.23
Study limitations
Three tests are used to diagnose infection with 
the SARS-CoV: ELISA, IFA and RT-PCR.16 We
used the simple ELISA test for all 1030 subjects
and the IFA for subjects who had positive ELISA
results. The IFA is highly sensitive and specific,
but is labor intensive. Antibody assays based on
virus-infected cells or whole viral lysates (such as
the ELISA test) can produce false positives from
closely related viruses of the Coronaviridae.24
In particular, because “common cold”-associated
coronavirus infections are highly prevalent, whole
virus-based assays, which have low specificity,
cannot be used for the diagnosis of SARS-CoV.19
In our case, although 124 subjects were seropos-
itive based on ELISA, we confirmed SARS-CoV
infection in only two patients by the more pre-
cise and specific IFA.
Similar results have been reported in a sero-
prevalence study of SARS infection of general
practitioners in Hong Kong, in which 5.1% tested
positive by ELISA but none tested positive by
IFA.17 IFA is an infected cell-based test for anti-SARS
IgG antibody that provides high sensitivity and
specificity.24 A recent study by Chan et al showed
that the sensitivity and specificity of the IFA were
both 100%.24
Conclusion
This study found low post-epidemic seropreva-
lence of SARS-CoV in a Taiwanese community
that is adjacent to a hospital where a nosocomial
outbreak occurred. Our findings support previ-
ous reports that the April–July 2003 SARS out-
break in Taiwan was primarily limited to hospital
settings, with only rare transmission by casual and
social contacts.20 Although asymptomatic carriers
or subclinical infections can occur in the com-
munity, the present study and other recent stud-
ies25 suggest that these are unlikely to be a source
of SARS reemergence. The results of the present
study will prove important for the development
and implementation of policies for the control
of SARS and possibly for the control of other in-
fectious diseases which have similar modes of
transmission.
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